March 6, 2012, 6:47 am The One-State Problem By SHMUEL ROSNER
JERUSALEM — “Israel/Palestine and the One-State Solution,” a student-run conference held at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government last weekend, achieved its goal before it even began. By bringing undeserved attention to an impractical idea, it drew enough wrath to raise its own profile.
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Under the guise of ending the Israeli occupation and answering the Palestinians’ grievances in one stroke, the one-state solution would spell the end of Israel as a Jewish state. That’s very much not what Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel had in mind when, invoking Auschwitz before delegates of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee on Monday, he said, “My friends, 2012 is not 1944. Never again.”
The response to the Harvard conference was as outraged as the idea behind the conference was unserious. The event was less an academic forum than an activists’ party — as might be expected with organizers like Justice for Palestine, the Arab Caucus, the Palestine Caucus, the Progressive Caucus and the Association for Justice in the Middle East. The program included just one speaker with first-hand familiarity with the peace negotiations . . .
They’re right: the one-state solution isn’t just impractical and improbable. It is a recipe for bloodshed.
The Jews of Israel founded their country on the belief that living as a minority among other peoples almost caused their annihilation. They would never agree to a proposal that would surely relegate them eventually to being a minority in their own homeland. . . . The one-state solution is a nonstarter, in other words, and that’s not what reasonable people looking to solve a conflict advocate. . . .
I’m not sure the Harvard conference should have been held: the one-state solution is an angering concept, and the gathering was an angering event. And all this buzz was a distraction from seriously discussing how to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The two-state solution is not exactly a practical idea at the moment. But it’s still the only one worth debating. It, at least, is based on the hope of building a new state, not of destroying an existing one.
I don't really expect a sensible answer from you but are India and Pakistan states? Do either one of them recognize the border between them?
>>>>>>> They are. Most of the border areas are defined (Except Kashmir region). Even in Kashmir has an unofficial boarder (Call LOC or line of control). Indian side of Kashmir is known as Indian Kashmir (With a Muslim majority) and Pakistani Kashmir is known as "Azad Kashmir" (Translated Free Kashmir).
Therefore, it is better defined that, Israeli and Palestinians boardrs. Despite rivalry rarely either of them try to grab more land (Like Israel does with Palestinian land) from another.
However the situation over there is not good. Far from being "Normal".
A state without delusions History has taught us that a Palestinian state must remain limited in its turf and in its weapons — because, like its Arab neighbors, it cannot be trusted to let well enough alone
few weeks ago, a caboodle of Harvard student groups, with the shameful half-endorsement and full tactical (and some financial) support from the J.F.K. School of Government and its Carr Center for Human Rights, sponsored a conference on the one-state solution for Israel and Palestine. Harvard doesn’t generally sponsor such one-sided partisan events. It would not promote in even the slightest manner — and I’m not asking it to do so! — a conference about the other one-state solution, the one that would have Israel annex the territories and make life even more difficult for the Palestinian population. How about a conference about widening the hole in the ozone layer?
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Anyway, this event had a basis in reality: there is now among those who are especially concerned about the Palestinians a new (well, not exactly new) solution being proffered. It is the “one-state solution,” from the sea to the river (and soon after across the Jordan, too) with a majority of Arabs and a democratic state. This would be, of course, the first state in history that would be Arab and democratic, the Arab Spring notwithstanding. Do we have any evidence at all that this is a political-cultural possibility?
I am afraid I belong to the minoritarian school, which believes that democracy and Palestinianism are not naturally symbiotic, and one of the reasons I believe this so is that Arab nationalism in general, and in its specific manifestations over a century and a half, has been hostile to democracy. . . . But anarchy and its Hobbesian counter-force in the Arab world do not ultimately depend on the Jews. They depend on the Arabs. You see it now in extremis in Syria. Sometimes there is a lull in the murderous character of the confrontation. But that depends on a crafty but temporary division of the spoils on sectarian lines, as the peace that hates does in Lebanon now. It will last six months, maybe a year, and then revert to its natural currency of blood. Remember that even the sainted King Hussein of Jordan murdered 10,000 Palestinians in 1970, in what they call Black September. But if he and his Hashemite soldiers had not killed them, they would have killed him and 10,000 other Jordanians. . . .
Now, the Palestinians are actually lucky in their demography. They are virtually all Sunnis. The Christian Arabs of Palestine have mostly left (while the Christian Arabs in Israel have grown in number, a phenomenon that makes a hash of the clichés about the xenophobia of the Jewish state). Still, extended family and clan and class do matter a lot among the Palestinians. American reporters in Israel and the West Bank haven’t told this story, and I am afraid that this is so because their Palestinian informants do not have it on their list of hot topics to peddle to Western reporters, who are often there only to find a “bad Jews” story. Every so often, though, you can read between the lines that the real narrative, the real conflict, is among the Arabs themselves . . . One structural impediment to the coherence of Palestinian nationalism is that in the history of Arab Palestine, the Palestinians were not the ones to do battle against Zionism and its successful state, except in the periodic episodes of high terror. In the War of Independence in 1948, Israel’s armed struggle was not against the Arab locals of Palestine; it fought instead against Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and (far-away) Iraq. In the Six Day War, it was ditto minus Iraq. In the 1973 Yom Kippur War, only Egypt and Syria fought in what they construed as war for the territory they lost in 1948. This is actually the most pathetic aspect of the Palestinian half-struggle against the Jews. Their war was fought by the armies of others who wanted Arab Palestine for themselves. Had Israel lost in 1967 or 1973, it would not have been Palestine in its place; the land would have been divvied up by the countries which had entered the fight to add turf to their own national cartographies. . . . Palestine, even though everybody talks about it as if it already exists, is much further away from being Palestine than at any time since the partition plan of 1947 that was to have created it. And it is a caricature of Israel’s recent decades of history with the Palestinians to describe its stance as entirely “rejectionist.” Quite the contrary. Over the years the Israelis have made so many conciliatory proposals to the Palestinians — two at the urgent behest of Washington — that they literally cannot grasp why Arafat and his successors turned them down. . . . The more the Arabs of Palestine demand, the less they will get, until what Israel may be willing to forfeit in the increasingly precarious regional circumstances will seem so parsimonious that they will deem it an insult to take. Actually, there has been no negotiating occasion when the Arabs weren’t over-reachers. This is why a settlement made with them or among them is also and always a hudna, a truce. A truce is not a settlement. It is only an interval between wars. Under these conditions, of course, the Jewish state and, for that matter, all nation-states, are forbidden by the obvious laws of caution to make grand gestures. . . . The Palestinian failure contrasts with the reality of Kurdistan; at least Kurdistan in Iraq and maybe soon also Kurdistan in Syria. Palestine was supposed to be in the ascendance and Kurdistan nowhere – but the Palestinians could not recognize one mirage after another when it faced them. They were deluded by fictions, and they deluded others in turn.
Why even otherwise-realistic world powers were also deluded is a problem for historians. Some people still have difficulty in admitting that the Jewish people is now an independent actor — and a dazzlingly powerful independent actor — in the international arena, in democratic reality, in economic learning and exploration, in scientific innovation, in the architectonics of a diverse and widely dispersed community into one. I say yes to a Palestinian state. But it had better be a state without delusions, a state limited in its turf and in its weapons, because, like its Arab neighbors, it cannot be trusted to let well enough alone.
At least three nation-states, the UK, the US and Canada allow evidence of legislative purpose to be admitted to show the meaning of a statute that is ambiguous.
What follows is a necessary minimum of that evidence to show the purpose of the Balfour Declaration that was adopted by the WWI Allies at San Remo that established the International Law provided by that Agreement and the British Mandate for Palestine.
It is widely accepted, but not correct, that the West Bank belongs to the local Arabs in Palestine who in 1964, at the suggestion of the Soviet dezinformatsia, decided to call themselves "Palestinians.” 
These "invented people"  also pretend they had long had a passion for self government.  The full extent of Israel’s claim of sovereignty has not recently been stated. At most, it is said by the Israeli government that no one has sovereignty over the West Bank, but that Israel has the better claim. 
A better view is that the Jews obtained a beneficial interest in sovereignty over all of Palestine in the 1922 enactment of the British Mandate for Palestine, that entrusted exclusive political or national rights in Palestine to Britain in trust for the benefit of the Jews that later matured into a legal interest on the abandonment of the trusteeship by Britain and the attainment of the Jews of a majority population.
The trusts or guardianships were to be called "mandates”.