"Land Swaps" and the 1967 Lines 

Dore Gold - The Weekly Standard 

June 20, 2011 

When President Barack Obama first made his controversial reference to the  1967 lines as the basis for future Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on  May 19, 2011, he introduced one main caveat that stuck out: the idea  that there would be "mutually agreed swaps" of land between the two  sides. He added that both sides were entitled to "secure and recognized  borders." But the inclusion of land swaps also raised many questions.

Several months after Israel captured the West Bank and Gaza in the 1967 Six Day War, the U.N. Security Council defined the  territorial terms of a future peace settlement in Resolution 242, which  over the decades became the cornerstone for all Arab-Israeli diplomacy.  At the time, the Soviets had tried to brand Israel as the aggressor in  the war and force on it a full withdrawal, but Resolution 242 made clear  that Israel was not expected to withdraw from all the territories that  came into its possession, meaning that Israel was not required to  withdraw from 100 percent of the West Bank. 

Given this background, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made clear in his  last Knesset address in October 1995 that Israel would never withdraw to  the 1967 lines. He stressed that Israel would have to retain control of  the Jordan Valley, the great eastern, geographic barrier which provided  for its security for decades since the Six Day War. He didn't say a  word about land swaps. For neither Resolution 242 nor any subsequent  signed agreements with the Palestinians stipulated that Israel would  have to pay for any West Bank land it would retain by handing over its  own sovereign land in exchange.

So where did the idea of land swaps come from? During the mid-1990s  there were multiple backchannel efforts to see if it was possible to  reach a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The  Palestinians argued that when Israel signed a peace agreement with  Egypt, it agreed to withdraw from 100 percent of the Sinai Peninsula. So  they asked how could PLO chairman Yasser Arafat be given less than what  Egyptian president Anwar Sadat received.

As a result, Israeli academics involved in these backchannel talks  accepted the principle that the Palestinians would obtain 100 percent of  the territory, just like the Egyptians, despite the language of  Resolution 242, and they proposed giving Israeli land to the  Palestinians as compensation for any West Bank land retained by Israel.  This idea appeared in the 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen paper, which was neither  signed nor embraced by the Israeli or the Palestinian leaderships.  Indeed, Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) subsequently denied in May 1999 that  any agreement of this sort existed.

There is a huge difference between Egypt and the Palestinians. Egypt was  the first Arab state to make peace, and in recognition of that fact,  Prime Minister Menachem Begin gave Sadat all of Sinai. Moreover, the  Israeli-Egyptian border had been a recognized international boundary  since the time of the Ottoman Empire. The pre-1967 Israeli boundary with  the West Bank was not a real international boundary; it was only an  armistice line demarcating where Arab armies had been stopped when they  invaded the nascent state of Israel in 1948. 

In July 2000 at the Camp David Summit, the Clinton administration raised  the land swap idea that had been proposed by Israeli academics, but  neither Camp David nor the subsequent negotiating effort at Taba  succeeded. Israel's foreign minister at the time, Shlomo Ben-Ami,  admitted in an interview inHaaretz on September 14, 2001: "I'm  not sure that the whole idea of a land swap is feasible." In short, when  the idea was actually tested in high-stakes negotiations, the land swap  idea proved to be far more difficult to implement as the basis for a  final agreement.

After the collapse of the Camp David talks, President Clinton tried to  summarize Israeli and Palestinian positions and put forward a  U.S. proposal that still featured the land swap. But to his credit,  Clinton also stipulated: "These are my ideas. If they are not accepted,  they are off the table, they go with me when I leave office." The  Clinton team informed the incoming Bush administration about this point.  Notably, land swaps were not part of the 2003 Roadmap for Peace or in  the April 14, 2004 letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Ariel  Sharon.

It was Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who resurrected the land swap idea in  2008 as part of newly proposed Israeli concessions that went even  further than Israel's positions at Camp David and Taba. It came up in  these years in other Israeli-Palestinian contacts, as well. But Mahmoud  Abbas was only willing to talk about a land swap based on 1.9 percent of  the territory, which related to the size of the areas of Jewish  settlement, but which did not even touch on Israel's security needs. So  the land swap idea still proved to be unworkable.

Writing in Haaretz on May 29, 2011, Prof. Gideon Biger, from  Tel Aviv University's department of geography, warned that Israel cannot  agree to a land swap greater than the equivalent of 2.5 percent of the  territories since Israel does not have vast areas of empty land which  can be transferred. Any land swap of greater size would involve areas of  vital Israeli civilian and military infrastructure.

Furthermore, in the summaries of the past negotiations with Prime  Minister Olmert, the Palestinians noted that they would be demanding  land swaps of "comparable value" - meaning, they would not accept some  remote sand dunes in exchange for high quality land near the center of  Israel. In short, given the limitations on the quantity and quality of  territory that Israel could conceivably offer, the land swap idea was  emerging as impractical.

In Jerusalem,  the old pre-1967 armistice line placed the Western Wall, the Mount of  Olives, and the Old City as a whole on the Arab side of the border. From  1948 to 1967, Jews were denied access to their holy sites; some 55  synagogues and study halls were systematically destroyed, while the Old  City was ethnically cleansed of all its Jewish residents. If land swaps  have to be "mutually agreed" does that give the Palestinians a veto over  Israeli claims beyond the 1967 line in the Old City, like the Western  Wall? 

The land swap question points to a deeper dilemma in U.S.-Israel  relations. What is the standing of ideas from failed negotiations in the  past that appear in the diplomatic record? President Obama told AIPAC  on May 22 that the 1967 lines with land swaps "has long been the basis  for discussions among the parties, including previous U.S.  administrations." Just because an idea was discussed in the past, does  that make it part of the diplomatic agenda in the future, even if the  idea was never part of any legally binding, signed agreements?

In October 1986, President Ronald Reagan met with Soviet leader Mikhail  Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, and made a radical proposal that both  superpowers eliminate all of their ballistic missiles, in order to focus  their energies on developing missile defenses alone. The idea didn't  work, Reagan's proposal was not accepted, and the arms control  negotiations took a totally different direction. But what if today  Russian president Dmitry Medvedev asked President Obama to implement  Reagan's proposals? Would the U.S. have any obligation to diplomatic  ideas that did not lead to a finalized treaty?

Fortunately, there are other points in President Obama's recent remarks  about Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that can take the parties away  from the 1967 lines and assuage the Israeli side. At AIPAC, the  president spoke about "the new demographic realities on the ground"  which appears to take into account the large settlement blocs that  Israel will eventually incorporate. Using the language of Resolution  242, Obama referred to "secure and recognized borders," and importantly  added: "Israel must be able to defend itself-by itself-against any  threat."

However, for Israelis, mentioning the 1967 lines without these  qualifications brings back memories of an Israel that was 8 miles wide,  and a time when its vulnerability turned it into a repeated target of   hegemonial powers of the Middle East, that made its destruction their  principle cause. Sure, Israel won the Six Day War from the 1967 lines,  but it had to resort to a preemptive strike as four armies converged on  its borders. No Israeli would like to live with such a short fuse again.  The alternative to the 1967 lines are defensible borders, which must  emerge if a viable peace is to be reached.

Dore Gold, a former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations, is president of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.