[QUOTE=Adelphe;1027559]Blu, hopefully Mario will come up with something better than presenting old news--something that's already been argued that lead to the particular request he referenced in the OP.
What can be concluded here with this piffle? He is between a rock and a hard place.[/QUOTE]
Whoa, she's playing the piffle card. must be serious
Quick comment on what God may know all of -- the possibilities --- and not all of the free-will decisions or random fluctuations. But know the character of a person and the overall statistical outcomes, which are not determinant but predictable to a small margin of error.
Whoa, she's playing the piffle card. must be serious
I am. :)
Quick comment on what God may know all of -- the possibilities --- and not all of the free-will decisions or random fluctuations. But know the character of a person and the overall statistical outcomes, which are not determinant but predictable to a small margin of error.
ncg, this is sdp's theory. He called it God knowing the "branching tree of all potential possiblities." Sort of a version of Molinism.
Unless I am convinced by Scripture and plain reason, my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot and I will not retract anything, for to go against conscience would be neither right nor safe. Here I stand. I can do no other. God help me. Amen.
Yes, it's self-evident that if you have an omni-god, then you can't have theological freewill.
Yes, I have no objection to your solution - the self-castrated omni-god - other than its saleability. Omni-gods who aren't omni fit only a wee niche market.
Aforetimes, I've given Adelphe certain advice on this topic - the substance of which is of course subject to musketeer-and-client privilege - but regretfully she's taken another course.
Even before he made the universe, he knew Ambrose would got to Saratoga Springs, when, how, what he'd wear, who he'd see, every last detail, every quark exactly where he foresaw.
Did Ambrose have a choice NOT to go to Saratoga Springs? He thought he did, but that was an illusion - there was never a second option which he could effect, and without a second option, no question of true choice arises.
The question is the same as, Does Ambrose have the power to show Yahweh's wrong? To make a liar of him? Or even just to take him by surprise? No. Under the omni rules, such things can't be.
Yahweh is omnipresent, throughout time as well as space. At the time Ambrose is setting foot in Saratoga Springs, Yahweh is not only foreseeing this from 14 billion years ago or more, but remembering it from 14 billion years in the future - and from all points between.
Alas for allusions that pass in the night and ironies that have to be explained!
Emmanuelle refers to the character of that name devised by the wonderfully named Emmanuelle Arsan, and having spelt it correctly in my draft, I thought it more in tune with our conversation to omit an m before posting.
ncg, this is sdp's theory. He called it God knowing the "branching tree of all potential possiblities." Sort of a version of Molinism.
Adelphe,
Thanks for exposing me to this line of thinking and historical development.
Molinists have responded to the aforementioned argument two ways. First, they claim that there are strong theological and philosophical reasons for affirming Molinism and if current epistemological methods do not align, then they must be reformed. Molinists are much more sure of the doctrine of middle knowledge than they are of this particular theory of truth-making. The second response is that what makes counterfactuals of creaturely freedom true is what makes anything else true â correspondence. William Lane Craig says "[i]n order for a counterfactual of freedom to be true, it is not required that the events to which they refer actually exist; all that is required is that they would exist under the specified conditions."
I am interested in truth conditions and a definition of truth, as a semantic definition, that would be reductive to principles of logic, affordances and communication theory. (Floridi)
Unlike many who have a rapid fire answers -- parsing this issue would take me considerable time and effort and I would not state an overall position without thinking it through.
That said - I would agree strongly with Lane about correspondence.
In theology, correspondence is the relationship between spiritual and natural realities, or between mental and physical realities. The term was coined by the 18th century theologian Emanuel Swedenborg in his Arcana Coelestia (1749-1756) and Heaven and Hell (1758) and other works.
Swedenborg states that there is a correspondence between, for example: thought and speech, between intention and action, between mind and body, and between God and creation. Correspondence is a causal relationship (i.e., thought is the cause of speech, intention is the cause of action).
The correspondence between spiritual and natural things extends to all objects in the physical world. Light corresponds to wisdom because wisdom enlightens the mind as light enlightens the eye. Warmth corresponds to love because love warms the mind as heat does the body.
Thanks for exposing me to this line of thinking and historical development.
I am interested in truth conditions and a definition of truth, as a semantic definition, that would be reductive to principles of logic, affordances and communication theory. (Floridi)
Unlike many who have a rapid fire answers -- parsing this issue would take me considerable time and effort and I would not state an overall position without thinking it through.
That said - I would agree strongly with Lane about correspondence.
ncg, I would have to agree with Craig there, "...The second response is that what makes counterfactuals of creaturely freedom true is what makes anything else true â correspondence. William Lane Craig says "in order for a counterfactual of freedom to be true, it is not required that the events to which they refer actually exist; all that is required is that they would exist under the specified conditions."[12]
although I am not exactly sure how correspondence plays into it and would have to study it more carefully.
As for the following:
Molinists say the logical ordering of events for creation would be as follows:
1. God's knowledge of necessary truths. 2. God's middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals). ---Creation of the World--- 3. God's free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).
Hence, God's middle knowledge plays an important role in the actualization of the world. In fact, it seems as if God's middle knowledge of counterfactuals plays a more immediate role in creation than God's foreknowledge. The placing of God's middle knowledge between God's knowledge of necessary truths and God's creative decree is crucial. For if God's middle knowledge was after His decree of creation, then God would be actively causing what various creatures would do in various circumstances and thereby destroying libertarian freedom. But by placing middle knowledge (and thereby counterfactuals) before the creation decree God allows for freedom in the libertarian sense. The placing of middle knowledge logically after necessary truths, but before the creation decree also gives God the possibility to survey possible worlds and decide which world to actualize.[4]
do you agree or disagree that this is a way for God to have foreknowledge and humans to have free will? Mario, do you have any objections?
It seems hard to argue against.
I think it is an option, just an unnecessary one--and all because of a modal fallacy. :)
Unless I am convinced by Scripture and plain reason, my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot and I will not retract anything, for to go against conscience would be neither right nor safe. Here I stand. I can do no other. God help me. Amen.