Adelphe-Marilyn Mac' Dubonnet

Jun 10, 2009 -- 8:01AM, Adelphe wrote:

I think this might be the day...

I'm feeling something coming on...

# I can feel it coming in the air and I ... hold on ... #

M.

Sir Mario de la Omelette le BB,

Lady Adelphe de Vixen tBB
May 19, 2009 - 08:52AM, Adelphe wrote:
Aristotle observed the fallacy in determinism 2300 years ago.
You have obviously thought that the argument that you have quoted verbatim

Yes, verbatim.  Clearly from my prior post of 5/18 4:14 PM ET where I gave you the reference to SEP.

from "Foreknowledge and Free Will", 4. Theological fatalism and other forms of fatalism (@ plato.stanford.edu), which is indeed logically fallacious (but does NOT include, as remarked umpteen times, neither God nor his supposed total omniscience) would, because of its fallacy, cause also (like a "domino effect" ...) the ruin of Hasker's Argument for Incompatibility [William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, Ch. 4 Two Arguments for Incompatibilism,  “The Second Argument Revisited”,  p. 73, 1993, @ Google Books] which I have presented at MdS post of April 07, 2009 - 06:23PM and which loosely corresponds to the above Argument for logical fatalism.
But the argument that you have above quoted ("Tomorrow's Sea Battle") is an argument for logical fatalism, whereas both Hasker's "Argument for Incompatibilism" and the Basic Argument for Theological Fatalism (see "Foreknowledge and Free Will", 1. The argument for theological fatalism @ plato.stanford.edu in the same article), are arguments for theological incompatibilism or (if the condition of Total Omniscience is not lifted), for theological fatalism.
As Linda Zagrebski (the author of the article @ plato.stanford.edu) says:
Unlike the argument for theological fatalism, the argument for logical fatalism has few defenders. One reason is that (2L) is less plausible than (2). But recently Warfield (1997) has argued for the equivalence of the two forms of fatalism if God is necessarily existent and essentially omniscient. Responses have been given by Hasker (1998) and Brueckner (2000), and there is a rejoinder to both by Warfield (2000).

I am sorry, but you are unable to use Ms. Linda Zagzebski (it is Zagzebski) as a shield (as you try to do with lope.)  She is not a theological fatalist.  Quite the opposite.  She calls this supposed "conundrum" or "dilemma", quote, a "pseudo-problem."

Further, the philosopher Haack says "[theological fatalism] is a needlessly (confusingly) elaborated version of Aristotle's argument in [DI IX]."

If you wish to argue, then you will have to retreat (a mistake, if you haven't gathered that by now) to Mr. William Omelette Hasker's response referenced above.

[from "Foreknowledge and Free Will", 4. Theological fatalism and other forms of fatalism, Argument for logical fatalism @ plato.stanford.edu]
Voila:the sinking of Diodorus Cronus' "fleet" is of no help whatsoever in sinking Hasker's Flagship Clarence Omelet!

Hardly.

Here are the facts.

1.  There will be a sea battle tomorrow or

2.  There will not be a sea battle tomorrow

1.  Clarence will eat an omelette tomorrow or

2.  Clarence will not eat an omelette tomorrow

One of each of those is true, and ONLY one.  They cannot be simultaneously true. This is the law of the excluded middle:  "Clarence will either eat an omelette tomorrow or not eat an omelette tomorrow" is necessarily true.

But it was never Clarence's choice "A or not A."  It is A or B or C or D or E.  If A is an event caused by Clarence's choice, then it is "A or not A."  And that's what God knows.  We might even say it is the principle of bivalence from God's perspective.

Determinism essentially states that it was ALWAYS necessary that A occur.

"The concept of determinism conveys the idea that everything that happens could not have happened in a different way than it actually did. Or alternatively, everything that happens, happens by necessity."(enotes encylopedia)

The fact that one of each of those is true does not determine it (nor does God knowing it determine it (nor does the positive truth value of Clarence's doing it determine it.  Clarence determines it.)

And THAT is what Aristotle all those years ago knew.  And you (still) don't.  In fact, I am aware of no philosopher that thinks the truth about the future means the necessity of the future.

Aristotle:  "It is necessary that the sea battle either will happen or will not happen, but it is neither necessary that it will happen nor is it necessary that it will not happen."

Epistemic determinism, logical determinism, logical fatalism, theological fatalism, they are all the same.

Here, in Hasker's argument, the premise is overly broad--there is an unstated assumption [bollocks!] in a major premise.  And how do we identify unstated premises?  By looking for the unstated premise without which the argument would NOT work and by adding the assumption that weakens the argument --in order that the premise be stated CLEARLY.
His unstated assumption here is the act is NOT free. [bollocks!]
The "unstated assumption" is only a figment of your fervid imagination. If you really want something "unstated", it is that Hasker asks the (unstated) question, "under what conditions Clarence's act is free?", and, with his argument, Hasker proves that the Clarence's freedom to act is incompatible with God's total (eternal, a-tempotal) knowledge of all states of affairs, past, present and future.

C1 - It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelette for breakfast tomorrow

Purely and simply:  What is true today enitrely depends on what happens tomorrow.

What we have here is an enthymeme [wow!!!],
See above: a ... er ... remarkable research, and a ... er ... remarkable ... waste of time, because it is made under the ... stated assumption that in Hasker's argument there is an ... "unstated assumption", an ... enthymeme ...

Yes, it is an enthymeme.  And very clearly so.  There is one way to prove that the premise is unstated and I have done it.  By placing the unstated assumption via the adverb "freely" within it.  IF there were no unstated premises, then this simple act would not modify his argument whatsoever.  However, this is not the case.  It completely destroys it.  

Therefore:  unstated premise.

[LAdVtBB] So, there are only two options here.  Clarence chooses the omelette freely or doesn't. [oh yeah!]
Therefore, let's try Clarence chooses the omelette freely [um ...]:
First, your (amply researched and "cited" ...) claim that Hasker would have "hidden" in his argument an "unstated assumption", an "undeclared premise", an enthymeme, is only a figment of your fervid imagination.

I fear you must face the facts.  Otherwise, you may demonstrate for me how stating the unstated premise doesn't cause the argument to lose its validity.

Second, Hasker, manifestly argues starting with the premise (C1) (NOT C1F) which simply states that "It is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelet for breakfast tomorrow" (with the obvious limits for humans in sstatements concerning of ALL statements about future contingents ...), leaving open the question whether God's total (fore)knowledge entails some constraints on his freedom.
That it is so is confirmed by the fact that if, as you have done, you "inject" the "choose freely" qualifier (propositions C1, C3, C5:C7 => C1F, C3F, C5F:C7F) you end up proving a contrario ("from the contrary") Hasker's argument.
As I have already previously commented, Haskers argument is made up of two parts:
[C1:C7], where, with the only assumptions that from the knowledge of Clarence's tomorrow's action, AND from the specification of God's total (fore)knowledge, follows the consequence that Clarence's act is not free, because whatever Clarence does, "it is not in his power to change God's (fore)knowledge of his acts, past, present and also future"

Once again, if "it is now true that Clarence will have a cheese omelette for breakfast tomorrow" then something causes that.  And that "something" is Clarence.  What is true today enitrely depends on what happens tomorrow.

Hasker presupposes libertarian freedom--this is your libertarian freedom.  Clarence is not free to contradict himself, no.  The principle of bivalence.  Give it a rest!

But there is also a funny twist to the story. When you tried to confront Hasker's argument in a "piecemeal way" (rather than in full, as I insisted), you came up with this "reduced argument":
Pity you are simply unable to discern [LOL!] that I could present an argument for compatibility using the exact same logical form... :o  For the tone deaf...
q = Tomorrow Clarence will freely eat an omelette, p = God knows that tomorrow Clarence will freely eat an omelette
1.  Necessarily, if God knows that tomorrow Clarence will freely eat an omelette, tomorrow Clarence will freely eat an omelette
2.  God knows that tomorrow Clarence will freely eat an omelette
3.  Necessarily, tomorrow Clarence will freely eat an omelette.
Voila.
[Adel's post of Apr 16, 2009 - 07:21PM, in reply to MdS' post of Apr 16, 2009 - 11:41AM - emphasis here MdS]
Q4A: How come that "an argument for compatibility" that was ever so smooth, "Voila", on Apr 16, 2009 - 07:21PM turns into "OOPS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!", "the argument fails" on May 19, 2009, - 08:52AM?

First, that had nothing to do with confronting Hasker's argument in a "piecemeal way."  That was your argument using the distribution axiom.  You claimed you "proved" incompatibility by this in affirming the consequence (LOL!)  You did no such thing because I proved the opposite--compatibility-- using your exact same logical form.  Affirming the consequence is a logical fallacy.  And that's one of the reasons why.  Because we both can use it to support antithetical arguments, it goes nowhere.  It is invalid.

Whatever you may say, you would be simply stubborn & obtuse if you still refused to admit that Hasker's argument may be criticized (if indeed there is something to criticize ...), BUT MUST at least be confronted in its entirety, without clumsily fumbling with it.

Who isn't confronting it in its entirety?  I (and every other philosopher and theologian who doesn't make sophomoric errors) reject the first premise.  I am more than happy to accept it.  Once you state the unstated premise or simply modify it.  It's that simple!

[LAdVtBB] Once again, [LOL!] if Clarence wasn't going to eat the omelette, God wouldn't have any "knowledge" of it whatsoever.   There simply would be nothing to know.
You are formulating the problem improperly. There are ONLY two possibilities:
EITHER Clarence WILL eat his blasted omelet[te] tomorrow;
OR Clarence will NOT eat his blasted omelet[te] tomorrow.
BUT, if we assume that God has perfect (fore)knowledge, there is nothing, absolutely nothing that Clarence's action (or non-action) of tomorrow can do to change God's perfect (fore)knowledge: therefore Clarence's freedom is incompatible with God's perfect (fore)knowledge. (whichever is the case with the ... omelette)

Exactly.  He can't contradict himself.  That is a simple fact of logic and life.  If you are at the computer at the moment, you are not able to be not at the computer at the moment.  That's just the way it is.  By bemoaning the fact that you can't do A and not A and trying to infer that this means you aren't free is manifestly ridiculous.

Yes.  And you see this as a problem because...? [Adel]
2. The problem is that if God's knowledge of every single detail of His Creation (past, present and future) is total and a-temporal, it is, by definition, a priori (lit. "before the event") which means that of course it cannot be also  ... a posteriori (lit. "after the event") ...
... per la contraddizion che nol consente ("a simple contradiction not allowed" - Dante, Inferno, XXVII, 120) ... [MdS]

This is sophistic tomfoolery.  God is eternal and atemporal.

I will add that you will have to argue very hard here [LOL! the impudent imp copies my very words!] against your earlier comment in this thread...
[*](2) Ambrose's decisions are the result of many factors (in particular his psychology), but, essentially of his freedom (and I frankly do not care a f§ck for finicky distinctions between "libertarian freedom" and/or freedom tout court) [MdS post of Jan 20, 2009 - 03:25PM - bolding here Adel]
...that you really and truly do not give a f§ck about that "finicky distinction."  I don't.  You, however, do. [bollocks!]
What is truly amazing is that, only a few lines after having "accused" me and Hasker of "insist[ing] on a form of libertarian freedom" you put my words in doubt as though you had not also read MdS' post of yesterday, May 18, 2009, 11:01AM, and my comments on Theopedia > Libertarian free will.

I cannot help it if your thinking is inconsistent. First you say you don't care (and it's give ) a f§ck for the finicky distinction and now you insist on it!  And Clarence being able to contradict himself and being able to have it.  This is not my problem, it is yours to resolve internally.  And speaking of inconsistency, if you reject fatalism (and you do) you must, in order to be logically consistent, reject theological fatalism.

So, as you claim that you don't "give a f§ck about that finicky distinction' between "libertarian freedom" and/or freedom tout court", explain to me what, IYHO, would be the problem with my concept of freedom.

Once again, your (and Hasker's) libertarian freedom requirement essentially demands that Clarence be able to contradict himself OR that no one can know what he will do (not even himself) in order for him to be free.

This is Hasker's definition of libertarian freedom.  Hasker says we are only free if "there are FUTURE ACTIONS OF MY OWN which timelessly EXIST in the divine ETERNITY which are such that it is in my power NOW, to bring it about that those actions DO NOT EXIST in eternity." (emphasis mine)

Pardon me but duh???  How sophistically inane can one possibly get?

Did you get that? 

I am only free if "future actions of my own that exist...are such that I [can have them] not exist."

El Stupid-o.

[LAdVtBB] Of course knowledge does not change the ontological state of affairs--the state of affairs here being that Clarence freely chooses to eat the omelette [or NOT to ... ] and God simply knows that.
How/when does God know that?
a. From eternity?
b. After Clarence has eaten (or NOT eaten) his blasted omelet[te]?

From eternity (assuming you are not putting eternity itself on a linear time-line.)  He knows the truth value of all propositions.  That He knows 2+2=4 certainly does not cause it.

Once again, what is the result? That you, yourself, Adelphe, by "injecting" the "choose freely" qualifier (propositions C1, C3, C5:C7 => C1F, C3F, C5F:C7F) you end up proving a contrario ("from the contrary") Hasker's argument.

And that is SOP.  Otherwise, once again, feel free to revise the first premise so that it doesn't weaselly, magick-ally conceal a lack of freedom.  It should be sooooooooooooooooooo simple to do (if there is nothing to hide)!  Just do it, Man!

What was childish was to propose to start a discussion on "Open Theism", and when I suggested that you could start it as a new thread, you sulk and want to have it here (but then don't even begin ...).
Mario the Bull$#!+ Buster

I offered the discussion, you said I could start a new thread, I responded I'd address it here.  Why do you care where?

... don't put all your eggs in one basket ...
... and ...
... most of all ...
... don't count your chickens before they've hatched ...

Clarence (a chicken) and God (an egg) are lying in bed with Mario watching ().
Clarence is leaning against the headboard, a satisfied smile on his face, eating an omelette. 
God, looking a bit irritated, grabs the sheet, rolls over, and says to Mario, "Well I guess we finally answered THAT question."

Lady Adelphe-Marilyn Mac'Dubonnet de Vixen tBB

Jun 10, 2009 -- 9:58PM, Adelphe wrote:

Sir Mario de la Omelette le BB,

Lady Adelphe de Vixen tBB
May 19, 2009 - 08:52AM, Adelphe wrote:
Aristotle observed the fallacy in determinism 2300 years ago.
You have obviously thought that the argument that you have quoted verbatim

Yes, verbatim.  Clearly from my prior post of 5/18 4:14 PM ET where I gave you the reference to SEP.

 

.............................

Once again, your (and Hasker's) libertarian freedom requirement essentially demands that Clarence be able to contradict himself OR that no one can know what he will do (not even himself) in order for him to be free.

This is Hasker's definition of libertarian freedom.  Hasker says we are only free if "there are FUTURE ACTIONS OF MY OWN which timelessly EXIST in the divine ETERNITY which are such that it is in my power NOW, to bring it about that those actions DO NOT EXIST in eternity." (emphasis mine)

Pardon me but duh???  How sophistically inane can one possibly get?

Did you get that? 

I am only free if "future actions of my own that exist...are such that I [can have them] not exist."

El Stupid-o.

[LAdVtBB] Of course knowledge does not change the ontological state of affairs--the state of affairs here being that Clarence freely chooses to eat the omelette [or NOT to ... ] and God simply knows that.
How/when does God know that?
a. From eternity?
b. After Clarence has eaten (or NOT eaten) his blasted omelet[te]?

From eternity (assuming you are not putting eternity itself on a linear time-line.)  He knows the truth value of all propositions.  That He knows 2+2=4 certainly does not cause it.

Once again, what is the result? That you, yourself, Adelphe, by "injecting" the "choose freely" qualifier (propositions C1, C3, C5:C7 => C1F, C3F, C5F:C7F) you end up proving a contrario ("from the contrary") Hasker's argument.

And that is SOP.  Otherwise, once again, feel free to revise the first premise so that it doesn't weaselly, magick-ally conceal a lack of freedom.  It should be sooooooooooooooooooo simple to do (if there is nothing to hide)!  Just do it, Man!

What was childish was to propose to start a discussion on "Open Theism", and when I suggested that you could start it as a new thread, you sulk and want to have it here (but then don't even begin ...).
Mario the Bull$#!+ Buster

I offered the discussion, you said I could start a new thread, I responded I'd address it here.  Why do you care where?

... don't put all your eggs in one basket ...
... and ...
... most of all ...
... don't count your chickens before they've hatched ...

Clarence (a chicken) and God (an egg) are lying in bed with Mario watching ().
Clarence is leaning against the headboard, a satisfied smile on his face, eating an omelette. 
God, looking a bit irritated, grabs the sheet, rolls over, and says to Mario, "Well I guess we finally answered THAT question."

Lady Adelphe-Marilyn Mac'Dubonnet de Vixen tBB

........................bump...........................